THOUGHTS

ON DREAMING

BRANCH

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DREAMING.

WHEREIN

The Notion of the SENSORY, and the Opinion that it is shut up from the Inspection of the Soul in Sleep, and that Spirits supply us with all our Dreams, are examined by REVELATION and REASON.

OCCASIONED BY

An ESSAY on the PHOENOMENON OF DREAMING, in a Book, Entitled, *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul; wherein the Immateriality of the Soul is evinced from the Principles of Reason and Philosophy.*

By THO. BRANCH.

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ERRATA.

PAge 3. Line 12. for *Meterialiſts*, read *Materialiſts*; p. 13. l. 26. for *have*, r. *hath*; p. 15. l. 10. for *effect*, r. *affect*; p. 16, l. 7. for *Declinations*, r. *Declination*; p. 16. l. 23. for *viſiated and deſtoyed*, r. *vitiated and deſtroyed.*

THOUGHTS ON DREAMING.

NO intelligent Perſons who have reflected on the *Phœnomenon* of Dreaming, will regard an Enquiry about it, as uſeleſs or trifling; ſince it is, perhaps, from hence that we are furniſhed with one of the moſt obvious and ſatisfactory Proofs Reaſon affords of the Soul's Exiſtence in a ſeparate State. To ſuch who have never attended to the working of the Mind during Sleep, I wiſh the ſame Pleaſure this Search has given me, and they will then readily grant, that their

waking Thoughts are not unworthily employ'd in examining their ſleeping ones.

The *State of Sleep* has been conſidered in very different, nay, oppoſite Lights.

Some have thence argued the *Materiality of the Soul*; attributing the Inconſiſtency, and ſeeming Irrationality, of Dreams, to the Body's Sleep; and from the want of conſtantly remembring them, have inclined to ſuppoſe Sleep an Affection of the whole Man, Soul and Body.

Others contend, that the Senſes being then laid aſide, the Soul is to be regarded as in a kind of ſeparate State; and from its Operations in Sleep, they infer its *Immateriality*, and the Likelyhood of exerciſing its Faculties when entirely diveſted of the Body.

As to the *efficient Cauſe of Dreaming*.

Many believe Dreams nothing more than *Thoughts during Sleep*.

Holy

Holy Writ assures us, that *Dreams* or *Visions of the Night*, have been sometimes caused by *supernatural Agents*. This has been the Opinion too of many wise *Heathen*, as well *Philosophers*, as Poets.

The Author under Consideration, supposes *all Dreams, whether common or extraordinary, to be represented to the Soul by Spirits; and that they must necessarily be so, because the Sensory is shut up during Sleep, from the View of the Soul.*

The *Meterialists* have a quite different Way of accounting for Dreams, *viz.* from *Matter and Mechanism*; but if they are pleased to consider this *Phœnomenon* half so accurately as it requires, they will find abundant Reason to distrust their Philosophy.

This *new Hypothesis*, which the learned and ingenious Author has admirably managed, carries something very curious and pleasing in it, as it leads us toward a belief, that when this World's busy and fatiguing Scenes are closed with the Day,

Sleep nightly uſhers us into a Theatre, where the Soul is entertained, and its Faculties are employed by Beings of an higher Rank. But tho' ſo many Charms attend this Conjecture, that one is ſtrongly inclined to wiſh it true, and finds a Reluctance in oppoſing it ; I am ſo unhappy as not to meet with compleat Satisfaction in it. I fear no Man ever invented an *Hypotheſis* (ſo partial, or rather imperfect, are we all) but he became enamoured of it ; and as the ſupporting this Favourite is a Point we much intereſt ourſelves in, 'tis not ſtrange that the Mind, ſo full of, and intent on one Object, ſhould not take in many Things which would preſent themſelves in a more extended and impartial View. On this Account it is, that we find it abundantly eaſier to overturn, or unſettle old Notions, than eſtabliſh new. I make this Obſervation, rather to excuſe myſelf, than blame any one elſe ; for, 'tis certain, the Mind may have Truth in its View, and yet be much miſled by ſingling out and purſuing ſome Particular which ſtrikes it powerfully. If any of my Objections ſhall occaſion this excellent Author's explaining himſelf, I know many

of

of his Readers will thank him, and me as the mean Inſtrument of it.

I ſhall not confine myſelf preciſely to obſerve on this Gentleman's Scheme; but endeavour to ſhew, not only that our *ordinary Dreams are not effected by Spirits*; but that the *Senſory is not immediately neceſſary to the Soul for producing the common Appearances of Dreaming*. And as I wiſh to make theſe Sheets of ſome uſe to Readers, who have not been converſant in Matters of this Nature, I deſire it may be forgiven me, that I touch a little on the *Powers or Operations of the Soul*; and proceed in a more minute and diffuſed Way, than ſpeculative Perſons require.

To form reaſonable Conjectures of Dreaming, it ſeems neceſſary to conſider,

I. The Manner of the Soul's receiving the Materials of its Knowledge, about which it is exerciſed when we are awake: And,

II. The Power it has over them when received.

From

From hence we ſhall be tollerably well enabled to judge of *natural* and *ſupernatural Effects.* If it appears that the Soul has no Preceptions during Sleep, but what might have reſulted from ſome of its waking Thoughts, and the Employment of its Faculties about them; and there be but a Poſſibility that our Dreams may be our own, methinks, 'tis unwarrantable, as well as unphiloſophical, to call in the Aſſiſtance of Spirits; becauſe it has a manifeſt Tendency toward diveſting the Soul of its active Power; and incapacitates it for the Exerciſe of its proper Functions without immediate Aid from the Body, or foreign Agents; which Suppoſition would greatly affect our beſt founded Notions in relation to its ſeperate Exiſtence. But more of this hereafter.

I. Then. *As to the Manner of the Soul's receiving the Materials of our Knowledge.*

I think we may very ſafely believe, that all the Particulars about which the Soul is employed when we are awake (except what ariſes from the Contemplation of

of its own Powers) had their Conveyance thro' the *Senſes*. We may, at leaſt, ſubſcribe to this Opinion, as far as the preſent Enquiry is concerned; for as to *Inſtinct*, and ſome other diſputable Points, they will not interfere with it. Let it, by no means, be infer'd, that I controvert the Poſſibility of communicating Knowledge, or Objects, to the Soul, without uſing the Body as a Medium. I am abundantly ſatisfied that God, who made the Soul, can, during its Union, apply to it in what Manner he pleaſes; but where, in any Inſtance, the ordinary and ſtated Method is not apparently diſcontinued, I ſee no Reaſon for ſubſtituting an extraordinary one.

II. *Touching the Power the Soul has over the Materials of its Knowledge, received by the Senſes.*

1ſt. The Soul can *add* and *multiply*, and *magnify*. As, when from its Idea of an *Houſe*, it forms that of a *Row of Houſes*. Or from a *Model*, a *large Palace*. And from a *Unit*, a *Million*.

2dly.

2dly. It can *diminiſh*, or *contract* an Idea, as it was originally received. Thus an *Army* is reduced to *fewer Forces*; and the *World* ſhrinks into a *portable Globe*. Indeed, *abſtracted Ideas* will not, properly, admit of this, or the foregoing Operations, as being Creatures of the Mind which have a fixed Standard: But all which have *Number* or *Quantity*, if a determined Portion thereof is not neceſſary to make up the Idea, may be conceived of by the Mind as augmented and diminiſhed.

3dly. It can *abſtract*. As when from the Ideas of particular *white* and *round* Bodies, it attains the general Ideas of *Whiteneſs* and *Roundneſs*. And from the Actions of Men, as they reſpect God, and each other, it frames the abſtracted Notions of *Piety*, *Juſtice*, &c.

4thly. It can *compound* its Ideas, and thence obtain, as it were, a new one. Thus, of *Juſtice*, *Benevolence*, *Temperance*, &c. it makes the complex Idea of *Virtue*.

5thly. It can, contrarywiſe, *divide* or *reduce* its complex Ideas into their conſtituent ſimple ones. So *Virtue* is brought back into *Juſtice, Benevolence, Temperance*, &c.

6thly. It can *compare* and *judge* of the Similitude and Diſagreement of its Ideas. As when the Difference is conſidered between *this* and *that*; or the Propriety of one, or the other, for a particular Purpoſe.

7thly. By its Faculty of *Memory*, the Soul reviews, and recognizes Ideas formerly received.

8thly. The Soul, by its *imaginative Power*, forms Multitudes of Appearances and Scenes, which never exiſted together in the Mind before; tho' the ſeveral Ideas that make up the Whole, muſt have been there. This is done by *compounding, dividing, tranſpoſing*, &c. what it finds in the *Memory*. The Objects produced by this Faculty, appear to the Soul, when it reflects not on their Manner of Production, as real as thoſe brought in by the Senſes.

Theſe Functions (which are all that are neceſſary to be conſidered with Regard to this *Phœnomenon*, and, perhaps, more than enough) together with the *Contemplation of its own Powers and Acts*, the Soul performs when we are awake, without the leaſt Aſſiſtance from the Senſes. If it can do thus much during Sleep, what a vaſt Fund may hence ariſe for the Employment of its Faculties! And how few Dreams are there which will not be accounted for from this Stock! That the Soul does exert theſe Powers in Sleep, one would think no Perſon, who believed it immaterial, could ſeriouſly doubt.

After the moſt ſtrict Enquiry I have been able to make, nothing appears which may occaſion any Heſitation in this Particular, except we can ſuppoſe, that when the Body ſleeps, the Soul is ſtript of its *Memory*. Indeed, if this be gone, and the Soul has no Means of reviewing any thing it was ever poſſeſſed of, the Faculty of *Imagination* muſt ceaſe, as having no Materials to work on; and the Objects of our

Dreams

Dreams will then be inconteſtably of foreign Communication.

Of Memory *and the* Senſory.

The *Memory* is uſually conſidered, both by *Materialiſts* and *Immaterialiſts*, under the Notion of a *material Organ*, which ſerves for a Repoſitory, or Store-houſe, of Images, as they were conveyed to the Soul's View by the Senſes; this is ſuppoſed to be ſeated in the Brain, or Breaſt, according to the Place aſſigned for the Soul's Reſidence, and is called the *Senſory*; and, to the ſeveral Paintings, or Traces thereon, it is that the Soul has Recourſe, when it exerciſes the Act of *remembering*; as from thence it received its firſt *Perception* of material Objects.

This Suppoſition has the Sanction of Antiquity, and is honoured with the greateſt Names of old and modern Philoſophers; it is, therefore, with the utmoſt Deference, that I take the Liberty of ſaying any thing in Oppoſition to it; but, I hope, a Deſire of coming at Truth, will not be miſcon-

ſtrued into an Affectation of Novelty, or a Fondneſs for Scepticiſm.

That ſome internal Organ is neceſſary for the Soul's firſt Perception of outward Objects, during its Confinement in the Body, where it is denied immediate Intuition, is certain. That a vaſt Variety, and large Scenes of Objects, are, at once, contracted and painted on a ſmall Part of the Eye, and thence conveyed, thro' intermediate Paſſages, to the Soul's Inſpection, Experience forbids our queſtioning; but what becomes of theſe Objects afterwards, or how the Ideas, excited thereby, are preſerved by the Soul, is far leſs explicable. There is a wide Difference between painting to the Soul from external Objects, and fixing, and making permanent thoſe Repreſentations in the Brain; as alſo between the Neceſſity there is for the former and latter. Perhaps we don't err much in likening the *Senſory* to a *Mirrour*, or *darken'd Room*, whereon many Objects may be at once viewed; but no one will go about to prove, that all the Repreſentations made thereon at any one Time, remain there, when the Aſpect or Situ-

Situation is changed, or when new Objects cover the whole, or part, of their Superficies; one, or both, of which, muſt, I think, inevitably be the Caſe of the Senſory. According to my beſt Underſtanding of the Matter, the Senſory is to be conſidered only as a Superficies; and, if ſo, let it be hard or ſoft; let it receive Impreſſions, or reflect Objects; I am utterly at a Loſs, in conceiving that a very ſmall Superficies, and ſuch it muſt be, can contain at once, that almoſt Infinity of Images our Memory will afford. Is it not reaſonable to think, that the Eye, ſuppoſing it filled, muſt diſcharge its Objects conſtantly on the ſame Part of the Senſory? Or if, by contracting itſelf, it receives only a ſingle Object, in any particular Point of View; muſt not that, and every other Object ſeen in the ſame Point of View, and Degree of Contraction, fall exactly on the ſame Part of the Senſory? We muſt otherwiſe, ſurely, aſſign an *Intelligence* to the *Objects*, or the *Senſory*. If it be ſaid, it is not pretended that all is retained in the Senſory, which have been received; for many Images, in time, leave no Trace of their having been there, and hence proceeds

Want

Want of Memory; and thus Room is made for new Objects. Were this admitted, we ſhall ſtill find the Senſory of far too little Extent. We are told, that all Objects which come to the View of the Soul, thro' the Senſes, are *remembered* to have been ſeen by it before, only from their *Patterns* already in the *Senſory*; but every time a known Object occurs to the Senſe, there muſt be a new Image on the Senſory; ſo that there may be Ten Thouſand Images of the ſame Object, at once on the Senſory; and, therefore, contract the Objects, and enlarge the Senſory, as much as Imagination will permit, it ſeems an inſuperable Difficulty that they ſhould, without utter Confuſion, find Place there. It cannot, very conſiſtently, be ſuppoſed, that the Soul rejects the ſuperfluous 9999; in regard they muſt be, agreably to the Notion of a Senſory, imprinted on it previouſly to the Soul's taking Cognizance of them. How happens it that ſome Perſons, Things, and Places, with which the Soul has been formerly much converſant, or greatly affected, but the Images of them have not been renewed in the Senſory, by the Senſe of ſeeing, ſhould remain, after

many

many Years, ſo perfect and vivid. It will not, ſurely, be ſaid, that the frequent reviewing them in the Senſory, has preſerved them; (perhaps this has been done but ſeldom) that were ſtrangely to confound *Cauſe* and *Effect*, by making the *Image* an *efficient Cauſe* of the Soul's having its *Idea*; and then making that *Idea* an *efficient Cauſe* to the *Image*. The Image might, every time it was beheld, effect the Paſſions; but that they, or the Animal Spirits excited thereby, ſhould retouch the Paintings, or Traces, in the Senſory, much ſurmounts my Conception. If the Senſory be a *material* Part, and a moſt ſoft and yielding one, as is ſuppoſed, it is more than wonderful, that any Traces made thereon, ſhould be permanent for any conſiderable Length of Time, notwithſtanding the Change the whole Body is perpetually undergoing; this will be poorly ſolved by ſaying that the ſame Organization of the Body is preſerved, tho' there be a Change in the Matter whereof its Parts are conſtituted. I don't know whether I may not venture to call theſe Images, or Traces, a *foreign Force* on the Organ; and ſuch a one as Nature is conſtantly

ſtantly endeavouring to remove. Nor is it leſs ſtrange, that Objects ſhould take their Places ſo aptly, as not to fall on, and ſo obliterate, or deface the Images already in the Senſory. This is equally unintelligible to me, with *Lucretius's Declinations of Atoms*, for which he could give no Reaſon.

I can't convince myſelf, that Objects conveyed thro' the Eye, impreſs Traces in the Senſory; but ſuppoſe it more probable that they are ſuperficially *painted thereon, by means of the Light* which carried them thither: For, methinks, 'tis not very reaſonably believed, that the Effect of Light on the Objects repreſented ſhould be ſtronger in the Senſory, after its paſſing thro' the Eye, and other intermediate Parts, than before; and that it ſhould then operate in a quite different Manner. The Objects certainly leave no Traces in the Eye; if they did, that Organ muſt ſoon be viſiated and deſtoyed: And ſo I apprehend, the Senſory would be, or at leaſt rendered in a very unfit Condition to repreſent Objects truly, were Impreſſions made in it. Whereas, if we ſuppoſe that

viſible

viſible Objects remain no longer on the Senſory, than the Rays of Light which conducted them continue there, and are unoccupied by any other Object, we ſhall account for the Soul's Preception of them, and leave the Senſory unhurt.

It ſeems the proper Office of the Senſory to receive Repreſentations, but not to retain them: For tho' never ſo many Objects paſs thro' the Eye into the Senſory, if the Soul be, at that Time, otherwiſe attentively engaged, they are unobſerved, and cannot be recovered by ſearching in the Senſory for them; which they might certainly be, if they had left Traces there. I think, we are to conſider viſible Objects in the Senſory, as the Effect of Light and Shade in Painting; but by no means as Pieces of Sculpture. If *Memory* depends on the *Senſory*, is it likely that the Soul would be ſo much at a Loſs as frequently 'tis, ſince ſo very uſeful an Organ may reaſonably be ſuppoſed moſt commodiouſly placed for its Inſpection; and, at leaſt, as much at Command as the far leſs neceſſary Parts of the Body? One would think that the Mind, which travels with incom-

parably ſwifter Expedition than the Eye, might very ſoon glance over every Image the Senſory contained. It hath been ſuppoſed, that were the whole Treaſure of the Senſory laid open to the Soul at one View, it muſt create Confuſion; but that ſeems improbable, ſince the Soul might regard, and paſs by, what ſerved, and what was impertinent to its purpoſe, as it does when it uſes the Eye about external Objects. The Soul, for want of ſuch a diſplaying the Contents of the Senſory, (admitting it thus ſtored) is often much confuſed and diſtreſſed about what it looks for.

As the Notion of a *Senſory* ſeems to receive its firmeſt Eſtabliſhment from the Conſideration of *viſible Objects*, it will not be amiſs to examine that of a *Perſon blind* from his Birth: For ſome blind Men have very copious Memories; and agreably to the Suppoſition of a Senſory, theirs muſt be well ſtored. 'Tis certain, ſuch a Perſon can form no Conception of Images, as they would appear thro' the Eye; but his other Senſes, in all Probability, make their Report to the Soul in a ſimilar Manner with

theirs

theirs who ſee. Sounds, Smells, Taſtes, and Touching, affect him as they do me, when conſidered meerly by themſelves unaccompanied with the Objects occaſioning them, which are diſplayed to Sight. Can it be ſaid, that his four Senſes convey Images or Repreſentations of the ſeveral Senſations they produce, and leave them on the Senſory? The *Picture* of a *Sound, Smell, &c.* ſeperate from the viſible Objects occaſioning them, ſeems very chimerical in a ſeeing Perſon's Senſory; but I'm afraid 'twere worſe to aſſert it in one's born blind. If it be deemed neceſſary that the Soul, in order to its remembering a viſible Object, ſhould actually behold it repreſented in the Senſory, it muſt, for the ſame Reaſon, be ſuppoſed really to hear, taſte, ſmell, and touch, in the Senſory, the Objects of thoſe reſpective Senſations, every time it remembers them. When we remember, the Soul ſeems to exerciſe the particular Senſe which conveyed the Object remembered, but that it actually does ſo, is certainly falſe. Our Ideas neceſſarily conform themſelves to the Appearances the Objects made to the Soul; but this, by no means, proves that thoſe ori-

ginal Appearances remain with us, tho' the Ideas copied thence do. I cannot admit that Appearances, and our Ideas, are ſo much the ſame Thing, that without retaining the former, we loſe the latter; but rather look on Ideas as Inhabitants of the Mind, whom it can retain, tho' the Appearances which gave Birth to them are annihilated.

It is not improbable that the ſuppoſed Neceſſity of a Senſory for Memory, maintains its Footing from this Conſideration, that when ſeeing Perſons *think*, it is always in *Figures* or *Images*: Even the moſt abſtract Ideas of thoſe who can read, are painted to the Mind under the Form of *Words*. This being the Caſe, what ſeems more plauſible than to conclude, that when the Eyes are cloſed, or the Mind turned inward on itſelf, it really ſees the Images it contemplates: Whereas this is wholly owing to the Senſe of ſeeing, and the Skill in reading; both which away, the material Senſory ſtands on too weak a Foundation.

The Senſory hath a farther and more pernicious Latitude aſcribed to it, than I have yet conſidered it in, *viz.* 'Tis made a Repoſitory of what paſſes in the Soul, and its Acts; and thus becomes, if I may ſo title it, The *Regiſtry of Conſcience*: But 'tis on many Accounts too ill qualified for this Purpoſe. When we reflect on paſt *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and call to mind how Objects, or our Actions, formerly affected us therewith; the bare Repreſentation of thoſe Objects or Actions, admitting them to remain on the Senſory, could not ſhew the Soul how it was affected with them; for it may be very differently, nay, contrarily, affected upon a Review of them; thoſe Objects may now give Grief, which, in Time paſt, inſpired Joy. If then the Objects, as they came into the Senſory, and were there delineated, will not ſhew us this, we muſt either ſuppoſe the Soul to have traced its Affection on the Senſory, ſo as to recognize it, which is vaſtly improbable, not only becauſe it is the Office of the Senſory to receive external Objects; but alſo for that in reflecting on Pleaſure and Pain, we do not obſerve them

to

to appear under any Repreſentation; they are conceived of as felt, not as deſcribed: Or, which is more rational, we muſt look elſewhere for *Memory* than in the *Senſory*. Beſide, How is it conceivable that the Soul's own Acts, wherein it ſolely reſpects itſelf, and which it can for a long Time remember, ſhould be deſcribed on the Senſory, *v. g.* the Act of *reflecting on its Powers?* But could we imperfectly Paint out this Action for ourſelves, who can ſee; tho', I confeſs, my Fancy comes vaſtly ſhort of it; if we ſuppoſe ourſelves in the blind Man's Caſe, who remembers ſuch an Act of his Soul, and conceives as clearly about it as we do, all Poſſibility of pourtraying it on the Senſory is gone.

I think we owe this Notion of the Neceſſity of a Senſory for Memory, to Philoſophers, who believed the *Soul material*; and endeavoured to account mechanically for the Exerciſe of its Faculties. They had no other imaginable Way of explaining Memory, than by aſſigning a Senſory to retain *Simulacra* or Images, which might again act on the Mind, when the Objects they repreſented did not. But thoſe

thoſe who hold the Soul a diſtinct, immaterial Being, will find that making a Senſory immediately neceſſary for the Act of remembering, claſhes very much with the Doctrine of its Immortality. We reaſonably ſuppoſe, that were the Soul diſembodied, its Diſcernment, which is now reſtrained and limited by the Organs it is forced to uſe, would be prodigiouſly extended. I would therefore gladly be informed, whether in ſuch a State where it had *immediate Intuition* of the Objects it now ſees mediately by the Eye, it can be deemed unlikely that it ſhould *retain its Knowledge*, at leaſt in ſome Degree, of thoſe Objects, tho' they might be removed from its actual Inſpection. [For ſurely the Soul cannot be omnipreſent.] If it be thought that the Soul would not be deprived of its Knowledge then, by the Removal of, or from the Objects, I apprehend that the ſame Reaſon which induces that Suppoſition, will have equal Force with regard to Memory independent of a Senſory, in our preſent State: For tho' now, the Soul ſees not outward Objects themſelves immediately, but their Repreſentations in the Senſory; its *View of thoſe Repreſentations* is as *immediate* to the Soul, as we can conceive

ceive its *View of the Objects themſelves to be in a State of ſeparate Exiſtence.*

The Office of a material Senſory, as far as relates to Memory, will, I think, be much better ſupplied, by ſuppoſing that the Soul has a Power of retaining its Ideas, or that Portion of them which we find it in Poſſeſſion of. It muſt be acknowledged a very wonderful Thing, that a ſmall Hint, or ſingle Idea, ſhould, as it does, almoſt inſtantaneouſly reſtore a large Combination of Ideas to the Soul: But this will not, very intelligibly, be explained, by ſuppoſing the Renovation of almoſt defaced Traces in the Senſory; ſince one Object can with no Probability be thought to act on more than its own Trace; and how it ſhould even do that, is to me inconceiveable. I apprehend that the attributing Memory ſolely to the Soul, will be clog'd with much fewer Difficulties than the contrary *Hypotheſis*: For tho' during the Reſidence of the Soul in the Body, the Senſes are the Canals thro' which Knowledge flows to it; the making a Senſory neceſſary, by way of Reſervoir, to contain it, ſeems not warranted by Philoſophy; as we ſhall find it impoſſible thus

to

to account for Memory, either from the Action of *Matter on Matter*, or an *immaterial Subſtance on a material one*, or *e contra*: And, if we cannot do this, it is a right Concluſion, that it muſt have its *Seat in the Soul*. The other Suppoſition will moreover draw after it ſuch Conſequences as ſeem incompatible with a right Belief of the Soul's Immateriality, and ſeperate Exiſtence, ſome of which will anon be remarked.

I am prolix, and I fear tedious, in treating of the Senſory; but it is a Point of ſome Conſequence, and this ingenious *Author*'s Scheme principally turns on the Suppoſition of its being ſhut up during Sleep, from the Soul's Inſpection; whereby he diveſts it of Memory, and thence infers the Neceſſity of receiving all the Materials of our Dreams from foreign Agents. I am induced to conjecture, that he found himſelf a little preſſed by Mr. *Locke*'s Arguments againſt the Soul's perpetual Thinking, but that it ſometimes nods with the Body, which has an Aſpect of making them too nearly related; and perfectly to get over this Difficulty (which he has

otherwiſe, with much Succeſs, attempted) he deemed it proper to detach the Soul from having the leaſt Dependance on the Body as to Dreams, by drawing a Veil over the Senſory in Sleep; whereby too, the Irrationality charged on our ſleeping Thoughts cannot be attributed to our wanting the Aſſiſtance of the Body, as tho' we owed the Perfection of Thinking thereto; but muſt be occaſioned by Spirits, who obtrude on us what we then think about: But I cannot help apprehending, that tho' this *Hypotheſis* makes the Soul ſometimes active, whilſt the Body ſleeps, and its Thoughts at that Time independent on the Body; yet it renders the View of the Senſory ſo neceſſary to Thinking, that, ſhould the Soul, deprived of its Aid, be at the ſame Time unoccupied by Spirits, it might, nay muſt, as ſoundly nod, as by the other Suppoſition.

Having thus touched on the *Powers of the Soul*, and conſidered the *Senſory*; I ſhall now point out ſome of the Conſequences reſulting from the Opinion that the Senſory is ſhut during Sleep.

Conſequences of the Opinion that the veiling the Senſory in Sleep, deprives the Soul of Subjects for thinking.

1ſt. It greatly debaſes the Soul, in that it makes the Body, or this Part of it, ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary to the Soul, that the moſt knowing, and beſt furniſhed one, muſt want Employment when debar'd Acceſs to the Senſory (unleſs ſupernaturally ſupplied) for there, according to this Suppoſition, its Knowledge is treaſured. To have Faculties, but no Means for exerciſing them; to have Knowledge, but no Ability of coming at it; borders very cloſely on having none. This Incapacity continues as long as Sleep, which is univerſally attributed to the Imperfection of the Body; and if the natural Inability of the Body, and its neceſſary Refreſhment, do, for the Time, diveſt the Soul of Power to take Cognizance of all its paſt Ideas, this has a manifeſt Tendency toward making the Body too neceſſary to the Soul. Methinks, *Epicurus* would have, extremely,

diſtreſt an *Immaterialiſt*, who had made him this Conceſſion, that the Body, in its natural State, had nightly deprived the Soul of its Knowledge. If it be ſaid, that the Suppoſition of ſhutting the Senſory is ſo far from making the Soul and Body one, that it evidently diſcriminates them, as it aſſerts the former to be active in the Contemplation of Phantaſms exhibited by Spirits, whilſt the latter ſleeps; and this affords Scope for the Exerciſe of all its Faculties: It is anſwered, That if it does diſtinguiſh them, it is not done ſufficiently and rightly; it takes a very noble and uſeful Faculty from the Soul, *v. g. Memory*, and converts it into a *bodily Senſory*, which, in the State of Sleep, can do neither Soul or Body any Service. Beſide, it doth not leave the Soul in Poſſeſſion of all its other Faculties; for the *Imagination*, which ſtrongly argues the Soul immaterial, cannot, by this Suppoſition, be exerciſed during Sleep. This Author, who has excellently endeavoured to demonſtrate from the Nature of the Soul, that it muſt perpetually think, had as little Occaſion as can be conceived, to make the Inſpection of the Senſory needful in that Behalf. *A Being, which,*

which, in its Nature, muſt think, ſeems to require, for that Act, no foreign Aid, either of Senſory or Spirits; as it could never want Employment from the Contemplation of its own Nature, abſtracted from all material Objects, and its Powers with regard to them.

2dly. We are, ſometimes, *conſcious in Dreams, that we have, formerly, dreamt the preſent Thing*. If every one's Experience will not tell him this, it will, at leaſt, aſſure him, that he frequently dreams of well-known Objects. How is this to be accounted for, ſince, for want of Recourſe to the Senſory, we can't ſee their Patterns there traced; which, on the Suppoſition that a Senſory is neceſſary for Memory, we ſhould do? We remember many Dreams. Have we two Senſories, one for ſleeping, the other for waking Uſe; If ſo, how is it conceivable that we ſhould be reſtrained from beholding our waking one, when aſleep, as freely as we do the ſleeping one whilſt awake? This Gentleman, indeed, allows but one Senſory for both theſe Occaſions, tho' that ſeems to add to the Wonder; for, to admit that Spirits make

make their Repreſentations on the ſame Organ where the Soul's Repreſentations (if I may thus call them) are traced, and yet, that, during Sleep, we can perceive theirs, but none of our own, tho' we retain their's when awake, is hardly explicable; nor does this, at all, ſolve the Difficulty how we ſhould, in Sleep, remember Objects we knew waking; for their being barely repreſented by Spirits cannot be ſuppoſed to give us Memory; as hath been before mentioned, and will, by and by, be farther conſidered. This mediate Application to the Soul, by Spirits, acting on a bodily Organ, ſavours too much of Matter and Mechaniſm. As the ſuppoſed Communication of Objects is internal, I ſee no more Occaſion for an Organ to give the Soul Perception, than in a ſeparate State; for if the Soul would be impercipient of Objects, held out to it in one Caſe, I think it might be ſo in the other too.

3dly. As *Conſciouſneſs identifies*, or makes us be *ourſelves*; and that it does ſo, is on all Hands agreed; the want of it would certainly diveſt us of that Identity. When

the

the Soul is diſembodied, how can Conſciouſneſs of its paſt Actions attend it, ſince all the Records are depoſited in the Senſory, from which there is a Separation till the Reſurrection of the Body? If it be ſaid, that God may, if he ſo pleaſes, till then, appoint a Spirit to employ the Soul, and give it Conſciouſneſs by ſome immediate Application, and ſo there will be no want of the mediate Uſe of the Senſory; I anſwer, Conſciouſneſs of the *Deeds done in the Body*, may, with much Reaſon, be ſuppoſed to conſtitute a very conſiderable Part of our future Happineſs and Miſery; and to imagine a Miniſtration of Spirits, to repreſent to the Soul what may be effected by its Faculty of Memory, ſeems very unphiloſophical, and raiſes a great Difficulty to ſolve a ſmall one. Seeing and remembering, are very different Things; the Soul's intuitive Knowledge in a ſeparate State, is no more likely to give it Reminiſcence, than its preſent beholding a Repreſentation in the Senſory, for the firſt Time, can make it remember to have ſeen it before.

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We have our moſt perfect Knowledge, touching *Souls in a ſeparate State*, from Revelation; which is ſo far from affording any thing which tends toward deſtroying the Memory of departed Spirits, that it appears, in many Places, in direct Oppoſition to it. In the Parable of the *rich Glutton* and *Lazarus*, *Luke* xvi. 25. *Abraham* is made to bid the former, Remember *that in his Life time he received his good Things, and* Lazarus *his evil Things.* And the *rich Glutton* intreats moſt affectionately for his *living Brethren.* This, indeed, was not related by our Saviour as a Fact, but ſpoke for Inſtruction only; yet it looks like a Proof that our *future Memory* will be our own. Again, *Rev.* vi. 10. The Souls of thoſe who had been ſlain for their Teſtimony to the Word of God, are repreſented as crying, *How long, O Lord, holy and true, doſt thou not judge and revenge our Blood on them that dwell upon the Earth?* There are many other Parts of Scripture, where this Point of the Soul's retaining its Memory, ſeems eſtabliſhed; but I don't perceive any, the moſt diſtant, hint of the Abſence of the Senſory being ſupplied by

Spirits;

Spirits; nor that paſt Thoughts, or Actions, may be remembered by an immediate Intuition of their Objects.

Let us now take a View of what Scripture will furniſh us with in regard to *Dreams*. Many are there recorded; and in every one of them, *the ſupernatural Cauſe is expreſly mentioned, or very diſcernable*; which affords no weak Ground for concluding againſt the Agency of Spirits in ordinary ones. Should it be objected, that in Scripture Language many natural Effects are aſcribed to God as their next and immediate Cauſe. The Event of theſe Dreams argues them ſupernatural: But I am not to expect this can be controverted by thoſe who make all Dreams ſuch; and therefore I proceed.

Scripture *Account of Dreams.*

Gen. xv. 12. *And when the Sun was going down, a deep Sleep fell upon* Abraham. God is ſaid to have ſpoke to him herein.

xx. 3. *God came to* Abimelech *in a Dream.*

xxvi. 24. *And the Lord appeared to him* (Iſaac) *the ſame Night.*

Chap. xxviii. Jacob's *Viſion of the Ladder*, has all poſſible Marks of a ſupernatural Agency.

xxxi. 11. *The Angel of God ſpake unto me* (Jacob) *in a Dream.*

xxxi. 24. *God came to* Laban, *the* Syrian, *in a Dream.*

Chap. xxxvii. *Joſeph's Dreams.* It is not ſaid that God, or an Angel, appeared to him; for which Reaſon, perhaps, his Brethren ſtigmatized him with the Title of *Dreamer.* But the wonderful Event forbids doubting of their Origin.

Chap. xl. Pharaoh's *chief Butler and Baker.* Their Dreams are not ſaid to have been ſupernatural; but the fulfilling *Joſeph*'s Interpretation of them, and the Conſequences reſulting therefrom, on him, ſeem to declare them ſuch.

Chap. xli. *Pharaoh's Dreams*, are, by *Joſeph*, declared to be from God; and

their

their exact Completion is a ſufficient Atteſtation that he ſpoke Truth.

xlvi. 2. *God ſpake unto* Iſrael *in the Viſions of the Night.*

Numb. xxii. 20. *God came unto* Balaam *at Night.*

Judges vii. 13. *The Dream of the* Midianite, has Marks of a ſupernatural one.

2 Sam. vii. 4. *The Word of the Lord came to* Nathan *at Night.* This, in *Verſe* 17. is called a *Viſion.*

1 Kings iii. 5. *In* Gibeon, *the Lord appeared to* Solomon *in a Dream.*

1 Kings ix. 2. *The Lord appeared to* Solomon *the ſecond Time, as he had appeared unto him at* Gibeon. [Which was in a Dream.]

Job. iv. 13, 14, 15. *In Thoughts from the Viſions of the Night, when deep Sleep falleth upon Men, Fear came upon me, and Trembling, which made all my Bones to ſhake. Then a Spirit paſſed before my Face; the Hair of my Fleſh ſtood up.*

Dan.

Dan. ii. 28. Nebuchad nezzar's *Dream*, is ſaid, by *Daniel*, to be a Revelation from God. But it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that, in *Verſe* 29. *Daniel* ſays thus; *As for thee, o king, thy Thoughts came into thy Mind upon thy Bed, what ſhould come to paſs hereafter; and he that revealeth Secrets, hath made known to thee what ſhall come to paſs.* I don't perceive but that the *Thoughts*, here ſaid to be the King's, may be underſtood *ſleeping ones*; if ſo, he had certainly his Memory without ſupernatural Aid.

Chap. iv. *This Dream of* Nebuchad-nezzar was apparently ſupernatural.

As to Daniel's *own Dreams or Viſions*, theſe were doubtleſs Revelations from God.

Zac. i. 8. The Viſions which the Prophet ſaw, in this, and the five following Chapters, were by Night, and are ſaid to be *the Word of the Lord.*

Joel. ii. 28. *I will pour out my Spirit upon all Fleſh; and your Sons and your Daughters ſhall*

ſhall propheſy, your old Men ſhall dream Dreams, and your young Men ſhall ſee Viſions.

Theſe are all to be ſuppoſed ſupernatural Effects. It was no ſtrange Thing that both Old and Young ſhould Dream; but uncommon for either to do ſo ſupernaturally. *St. Peter*, in the *2d. Chapter of Acts*, explains this Prophecy, by the Effuſion of the Holy Ghoſt on the Day of *Pentecoſt*.

Job xxiii. 14 to 18. *God ſpeaketh once, yea twice, yet Man perceiveth it not: in a Dream, in a Viſion of the Night, when deep Sleep falleth upon Men, in Slumberings upon the Bed; then he openeth the Ears of Men, and ſealeth their Inſtruction, that he may withdraw Man from his purpoſe, and hide Pride from Man.*

This ſeems to point at ſome extraordinary *Revelations* made to Perſons, during Sleep, for their Conduct. The *Tranſlators*, in the Contents of this Chapter, underſtand it thus. They ſay, *God calleth Man to Repentance by Viſions.* I preſume it cannot be extended to ordinary Dreams.

Numb. xii. 6. *If there be a Prophet among you, I, the Lord, will make myſelf known unto him in a Viſion, and will ſpeak to him in a Dream.*

Jer. xxiii. 28, 29. *The Prophet that hath a Dream, let him tell a Dream, and he that hath my Word, let him ſpeak my Word faithfully; what is the Chaff to the Wheat, ſaith the Lord? Is not my Word like Fire, ſaith the Lord? And like a Hammer that breaketh the Rock in Pieces?*

The two laſt Quotations ſeem to declare, in the moſt forcible Terms, that there is ſome obvious Criterion whereby to diſtinguiſh ſupernatural from common Dreams.

Job. vii. 13, 14. *When I ſay my Bed ſhall comfort me, my Couch ſhall eaſe my Complaints; then thou* (the Lord) *ſcareſt me with Dreams, and terrifieſt me thro' Viſions.*

It is not improbable that *Job* thought his diſturbed Sleep might ariſe from Natural

tural Cauſes, tho' he aſcribes it immediately to God; as he does every one of his numerous Afflictions. Or, perhaps, he conſidered the Permiſſion of God as equivalent to his Order. But whatever his Opinion was, it will not warrant our ſuppoſing all Dreams ſupernatural Effects; nor can we reaſon from his Caſe to our own; becauſe we are told, that he was given into the Hand of *Satan*, who may very conſonantly be thought to have diſtreſſed him Sleeping and Waking, to the utmoſt Extent of his limited Power.

Eccleſ. v. 3. *Solomon*, tho' he had two ſupernatural Dreams, which have been above taken Notice of, ſays here, *A Dream cometh thro' Multitude of Buſineſs.* And in the 7th verſe, *In the Multitude of Dreams, and many Words, there are alſo divers Vanities; but fear thou God.*

From the Conſideration of all which Places of *Scripture*, I think the following Inferences are fairly deducible, *viz.*

1ſt. That there are Dreams in which Spirits have no Concern.

2dly,

2dly. That ſuch Dreams only, which by ſome very extraordinary and diſtinguiſhable Impulſe on the Mind, or by their Subject, or their Accompliſhment, evidently ſhew their ſupernatural Origin, can on any warrantable Foundation be attributed to Spirits.

3dly. That Dreams ſent from God are for Purpoſes of Moment.

If then *Revelation* makes ſo little for the Suppoſition that all Dreams are Supernatural; it is proper to examine what Difficulties there are in the *Phœnomenon* of Dreaming, which may ſupport it.

Difficulties in accounting for Dreams from NATURAL CAUSES, *attempted to be ſolved.*

DIFFICULTY I.

The Soul in Dreams is often entertained with Repreſentations of Perſons and Things, which never occurred to it waking.

SOLUTION.

SOLUTION.

Let the Powers of the Soul, which are before mentioned, be conſidered, and it will appear, that there are none of its ſleeping Thoughts (except ſuch as I ſhall not ſcruple to admit Supernatural) but what may be thence well accounted for. The Imagination frequently exhibits as myſterious Compoſitions when awake, as during Sleep, and ſuch as never exiſted together in Nature, nor received their Being before from Fancy.

DIFFICULTY II.

The Soul ſoon detects the Fallacy of the Chimeras its Imagination raiſes, whilſt we are awake; but in dreaming, it is quite the reverſe: We Joy, Grieve, Fear, Hope, Act, and Suffer, and ſtill acquieſce in the Reality of the Objects affecting us: And therefore we are not to believe the Soul conſtantly impoſes thus on itſelf; but rather that it is under the Influence of a ſupernatural Agent.

SOLUTION.

When awake, we have the *Senſes* to conſult about the Truth or Fallacy of ſuch Objects as the Soul creates to its own Diſturbance. Should we conceit, with our Eyes ſhut, that any terrifying Object approaches us, it is but opening them, and we are undeceived. Where this kind of Evidence is wanting, thoſe Minds which we call weak, are oftentimes as much affrighted waking as dreaming. To this Cauſe it is to be attributed that Spectres are moſt uſually ſeen in the Dark, when Perſons have only the Mind's Eye to appeal to. If the Imagination is too ſtrong for the waking Senſes, as ſometimes it is, are we to wonder, that the Soul does not detect in Sleep, the fantaſtick Scenes of its own raiſing? I do not ſee a Poſſibility that the Soul can determine againſt the Reality of its own Perception of Objects, where the Senſes do not contradict it. If it be ſaid, that by a Train of ſound Reaſoning the Soul can, and does, when we are awake, prevent the Impoſition of the Imagination, without Recourſe to the Senſes. I would

have

have it conſidered, whether in any ſuppoſed Inſtance of its ſo doing, one of the Senſes is not a Monitor, who makes us diſtruſt the Reality of the Object under the Soul's View. When a Man ſets his Imagination to work in collecting horrible Ideas, he is aſſured that the Forms which will ariſe before his Mind, have their Exiſtence only there; becauſe he receives the Conviction of his Senſes, that they do not convey them. He who reads ſuch Collection, knows that his Eyes behold only a Deſcription, but not the Thing deſcribed; and yet how powerfully is the Soul ſometimes affected by it! In Sleep, the Faculty of Imagination is exerciſed by the Soul, without the leaſt Apprehenſion that the Senſes do not bring in the Objects.

OBJECTION.

We experience as manifeſt a Difference in Dreaming that we Read, or Hear, Deſcriptions of Perſons, or Things, and that we ſee them, as we do between thoſe Acts when awake: But if the Senſes, as I would ſuppoſe, are neceſſary to make this Diſtinction

ſtinction, whence can it ariſe, that theſe being laid aſide in Sleep, we ſhould be ſo much more affected in one Caſe, than the other.

ANSWER.

Tho' the Senſes are actually uſeleſs to the Soul during Sleep, they are imaginarily exerciſed. But as when the Soul is conſcious of ſeeing Words, or hearing Sounds in a Dream, it were abſurd to conceit, that it could, at the ſame Time, be conſcious they were Things or Perſons: So when it is conſcious of perceiving Perſons or Things, it has no means of diſproving the preſent Perception. It does in both Caſes, and alike miſtakenly, take it for granted that it Sees and Hears corporeally: And we are in either Caſe affected, as we ſhould be, had we the real Uſe of the Senſes, and the ſame Objects were brought in by them.

DIFFICULTY III.

Our Dreams are ſometimes for the whole Night, of very different Subjects from the Buſineſs

Buſineſs and Thoughts of the Day; but were they only Cogitations of the Mind, and not exhibited by foreign Agents, they would in all probability participate greatly of our waking Thoughts, eſpecially when the Mind has been intenſely engaged upon ſome particular Affair.

Solution.

Dreams many times ſo apparently reſult from the Buſineſs, Study, Pleaſures, and Uneaſineſs of the Day, that they forbid our calling in foreign Aid. It is true, that they ſometimes, tho' rarely, conſiſt of quite oppoſite Subjects; as where a troubleſome Day is ſucceeded by a delightful Night, or the contrary. But even in this Caſe we ſhall not be much at a loſs to find a poſſible Way for the Mind's effecting this, if we conſider, with what great Difficulty it is that we fix it long, whilſt awake, on one Subject; and that in Oppoſition to our beſt Endeavours, and notwithſtanding its Attention is helped by ſenſible Objects relating to what we would confine it to, ſuch as Books, Converſation, Writing our Thoughts, &c. It is ever and

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anon flying off, and will hardly be held in: And theſe away, it is far from being ſtrange that the Mind, naturally a Wanderer, ſhould rove at large. It may be remarked too, that till the Attention of the Soul to its waking Thoughts is abated, it is impoſſible to ſleep. When we addreſs ourſelves to Reſt, we deſignedly take off the Mind from particular Objects which engroſſed it; and avoid, as much as may be, regarding or reflecting on what paſſes in it. I think we are not to be much ſurpriſed at our having no more of the Days Thoughts in Dreams, which we thus take care to lay aſide for others, before we can Dream.

Objection.

May it not very reaſonably be ſuppoſed, that the Soul, during Sleep, would, if it had the Uſe of the Senſory, and were not prevented by Objects ſupernaturally communicated to it, take again into its Conſideration, Matters that we had been juſt before converſant about, and much intereſted in, tho' they were poſtponed for the purpoſe of going to ſleep; as we drop

drop and resume Affairs, for particular Ends, whilst awake? But the Impracticableness of doing this in Sleep, proves, either that our Thoughts are obtruded on us by Spirits; or that we have not the Use of Memory to remind us of the Business of the Day.

ANSWER.

We must Sleep on such Terms as God has been pleased to grant us. We are not conscious during Sleep, that we are asleep; had we any way of making this Discovery, we should, perhaps, then employ our Time otherwise than we do. This Knowledge is, doubtless, concealed from us for very wise Ends; tho' I cannot presume to assign them. It would, methinks, be a very astonishing Consideration to the Soul, were it conscious in Sleep that it had not Power over any part of the Body, but must attend its Leisure before it would be employed: I do not apprehend it could then be satisfied it was not in a State of Separation. And had the Soul a Consciousness of Sleeping, and, at the same time, a Power of Commanding the

Senses,

Senſes, it would hardly be poſſible to refrain from exerciſing it; and I doubt not but we ſhould, to our much greater Prejudice, deny the Body its needful Reſt. As to *Memory*, the Exerciſe of that Faculty in Sleep, will be proved in the *Solution* of the 6th *Difficulty*, and elſewhere, ſufficiently to ſhew the Materials of our Dreams our own. It cannot be denied, that the Buſineſs of the Day is frequently Part of our Nightly concern.

DIFFICULTY IV.

We are ſometimes conſcious in Dreams, that we are Dreaming; which we could not poſſibly be, unleſs Dreams were the Effect of a foreign Agent: The Soul would otherwiſe be only Conſcious that it *Thought*; whereas here it ſtrives by awaking the Body, to extricate itſelf from ſome Uneaſineſs oppreſſing it, which ſeems plainly forced on it.

SOLUTION.

The Soul, as far as comes within my Obſervation, has never this Conſciouſneſs of

Dreaming, but in Caſes where its Perturbation is very great; and there it is highly probable, that, previous to the Conſciouſneſs, the Soul's violent Emotions may have ſo far rouſed one of the Senſes, as to receive ſufficient Teſtimony from it, of having Dreamt. If this be the Caſe, the Conſciouſneſs is not to be attributed to the ſleeping, but the waking Man. Had we Conſciouſneſs at any time in Sleep, that we then Dreamt, I ſee nothing which hinders our perpetually having it. But this no one will aſſert.

DIFFICULTY V.

The Soul being undiſturbed in Sleep, by the Avocations of the Senſes, if its Dreams were its own Thoughts, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that they would be more Converſant about Matters of Importance, and be conſiſtent among themſelves; and that we ſhould Reaſon better, at leaſt as well, when its Faculties are diſengaged from material Objects, as we do awake: Whereas our Dreams are, for the moſt part, trifling, vague, ridiculous, abſurd, *&c.* And if this be attributed, as I would

have it, to the Soul's wanting the Senſes, we ſhall make its moſt rational Thinking owing to the Body.

SOLUTION.

Dreams are ſometimes on Subjects not unworthy our beſt waking Thoughts; and we Reaſon on them to a conſiderable length. I think we always Reaſon as rightly, and deſign acting as properly, from what occurs to the Soul in Sleep, as when awake; and our Paſſions are affected in much the ſame Degree: And I am apprehenſive, that moſt of the Folly charged on Dreams, would, on a ſtrict Examination, find its Parallel in the waking Man. Methinks the Dreams here objected to, are but with an ill Grace charged on Spirits. It ſeems, very likely, that the Body, by its various Uneaſineſs and Diſorders during Sleep, tho' they are not ſufficient to awake us, does very much contribute to the Confuſion of our Dreams, and the ſhifting a train of Thoughts. It may, without Impeachment of the Soul's Immateriality, be admitted to affect it in this State, as it does in a waking one. The Senſes are commonly

commonly ſuppoſed great Impediments to intenſe Thinking; and ſo they truly are when they affect us in ſuch a manner as to call us off from the Objects then under the Soul's Inſpection; but, on the contrary, they are ſometimes Auxiliaries to the Soul, without whoſe Aid we ſhould ramble waking, as we do in Dreams. But this having been already touched on, I wave a further purſuit of it. It may not be improper to obſerve, that the Suppoſition of a ſhut or diſordered Senſory, makes the Body no leſs an impediment to the Soul's rational Thinking, as it is here underſtood, than the Abſence of the Senſes, which I aſſign as the obſtacle: Tho' it is certainly true, in both Caſes, that a Thing may hinder Perfection, which cannot alone cauſe it.

DIFFICULTY VI.

We often Dream of dead Perſons, whom we ſuppoſe living, nor remember that we ever knew they were dead; and of long paſt Actions and Circumſtances of our Life, and believe them preſent: But had we a ſight of the Senſory, or the Uſe of Memory, the Soul could not make this

great Miſtake: Therefore both theſe are wanting, and the Deluſion is occaſioned by ſuch Appearances as are preſented to the Soul by Spirits.

SOLUTION.

The Soul in many Caſes exerciſes the Memory during Sleep; it does it, in ſome Degree, in thoſe this *Difficulty* ſuppoſes; where it Recognizes our dead Acquaintance, paſt Actions and Circumſtances. This alone is ſufficient to deſtroy the Suppoſition of a ſhut Senſory; or, eſtabliſhes a Memory independent of its Aid. As to the particular Circumſtances which the Soul does not remember; may we not reaſonably conjecture its Attention too much engaged by the Objects of its preſent Thought, to have recourſe to the Memory, and draw Inferences from it? When we are awake, and think on Perſons dead, and paſt Actions; it is uſual, at firſt, to conſider them as dead and paſt: Where it is otherwiſe, and they ſtart up ſuddenly in the Mind, they ſometimes occaſion a long Series of Thought before we reflect on them as not living and preſent; Indeed

it

it is from the Memory that we procure this teſtimonial on Reflection; but here the Memory is exerciſed with another View; in the former Caſe, it ſhewed us the Objects in one part of Time, and in the latter at another. Beſides, I would have it remembered, that when we are awake we have the Senſes to give us Aſſurance that we are only Thinking; but in Sleep they are, by miſtake, ſuppoſed to concur in every Repreſentation the Memory and Imagination ſuggeſt: this may, perhaps, retard the Soul's farther Enquiry about them. I believe I may appeal to the Reader for Inſtances of Dreaming, where the Dead are thought of as Dead; and former Circumſtances of Life and Actions, as paſt: If theſe at any time, during Sleep, appear in a true Light, it aſſures us of Memory; and how at other Times they come only to be regarded as living and preſent, has, I apprehend, been ſufficiently accounted for.

DIFFICULTY VII.

We ſometimes in Dreams conceit ourſelves in Places, Circumſtances, and amongſt Perſons

Perſons, all which we ſeem very well acquainted with; nor are at all ſurprized at our Situation or Condition: but when we awake, we are conſcious that we never ſaw or thought of them before; and wonder at this our late Familiarity. 'Tis hence infer'd, that the Memory muſt be ſuſpended during Sleep, otherwiſe it would have convinced us of our Error; for the Patterns of thoſe Objects not being in the Senſory, we ſhould have known them to be New. Here this ingenious Author ſuppoſes, that the Spirits who entertain us, give us, together with the Objects, a kind of ſupernatural Memory, which makes us thus intimately acquainted with them, as ſoon as they are exhibited.

Solution.

This is to be accounted for in much the ſame Way with the *laſt Difficulty*, viz. That the Soul being buſily engaged about its Objects, and much engroſſed by them, and not diſtruſting the concurrence of the Senſes, does not ſtay to ask the Queſtion how it became thus intimate with its new Acquaintance; nor conſiders at all whether it does, or does not, remember them;

it takes Things as it finds them. For I think this Case never happens but in such Scenes where we have a considerable Part to act ourselves. When the Mind rambles awake, and gets into new Scenes; their being new is not discovered to it by the Imagination which raised them, nor by the Contemplation of them, when considered in and by themselves; but it arises from a quite different Act of the Soul. 'Tis one Thing to *think*, in this Sense, and another to *remember*; the former Act has merely the Objects or Ideas in View as they then affect us; the latter proceeds from a Reflection on the Objects, and our Relation to them, and an Examination of the Memory, whether they ever made their Appearance before. There is a great Difference between actually beholding new Scenes when awake, and Imagining them; but there is a much wider between Waking and Dreaming. We cannot certify ourselves in Sleep, that we are only thinking; we don't regard our Dreams as Thoughts; but we can, when awake, convince ourselves, by help of the Senses, that Thinking is not Seeing, Hearing, &c. Therefore, whatever Station or Company the Imagi-

Imagination puts us in during Sleep, the ſame muſt be taken by the Soul as real; if it be repreſented as new, or as old, ſo it muſt paſs, unleſs, by another Act of the Soul, we reflect thereon. The Soul does frequently thus reflect in Sleep, and looks on the Objects of its Dreams and its Situation, with reſpect to them, as new or old. If this be not perpetually the Caſe, 'tis enough to ſhew clearly, that the Soul can exerciſe its Memory at ſuch Time when 'tis aſſerted to receive no Aid from the cloſed Senſory. As to the Memory, or Knowledge, ſuppoſed to be communicated together with the new Objects, by Spirits; I have no conception of its poſſibility, in the preſent Caſe: Seeing, and Remembering to have ſeen, differ, at leaſt, as widely as paſt and preſent Time. If this Doctrine, that Spirits can make us believe that we have ſeen what we never ſaw, obtains, I don't know how we can be ſure that any thing will appear new to us in a future State; which is but an uncomfortable Conjecture, and vaſtly improbable; to ſay no more of it. The moſt perfect and adequate Knowledge of Objects, by immediate Intuition, cannot be ſaid to

make

make us remember them; nor would they be the leſs New, but rather the more ſo. If Spirits, when they exhibit new Objects in Sleep, prevent our ſuppoſing them new, they can, as far as I underſtand what is meant by this ſupernatural Memory, or Knowledge, only confine us from reflecting on their Newneſs; and this I have endeavoured to ſhew how the Soul itſelf, may, very reaſonably, paſs over unremark'd.

DIFFICULTY VIII.

There are not wanting Inſtances of Dreaming that we are expoſed to imminent Danger, on Account of Crimes formerly committed by us; and that we receive Praiſe and Rewards, for paſt Services, and other-like Matters, wherein Reſpect is had to paſt Time; in all which Caſes we are accompanied with a Conſciouſneſs of the reality of the imagined paſt Actions, which we never performed. From hence an Inference is drawn, that as this Conſciouſneſs can have no Foundation in our own Memory, it muſt neceſſarily be of foreign Communication. And, 'tis ſaid, that tho' the laſt *Difficulty* may be ac-

counted for in the Manner I would have it; this cannot; in regard here is, indiſputably, a Conceſſion made by the Soul, which Memory, whether ſeated in the Soul, or Senſory, could not warrant its making. I cannot ſtate this Difficulty, ſo as not to exceed Probability, in a more preſſing Manner, than by giving two Inſtances of Dreaming, produced by this Author; the Exactneſs in the Relation of which, he ſays, and, I doubt not, may be depended upon; *viz.* " A Perſon dreams that he hath " lived for a conſiderable Time in a State of " Marriage, with a certain Woman, who " had been dead many Years before; and " tho' he knows not the Beginning of " this Affair, or how it came about, yet " he allows it to be ſo, and remembers " *ſome Circumſtances* of their paſt Life to- " gether, and ſeems to know the Situa- " tion of their Circumſtances at preſent, " as if he had been led into it *from the Ex-* " *perience of ſome Years.* Again, another " hath this Scene preſented to him in his " Sleep. He fancies a *Perſon reads* to him " certain Sentences out of a Book, and " that neither the *Perſon reading*, nor the " *Subject read*, are unknown to him, but

" that

" that he is familiarly acquainted with
" both; inſomuch, that he knows before-
" hand what the other is to read to him,
" and the Deſign of the Writer; and has
" his Remarks ready to offer upon it, as
" if he had peruſed this *viſionary Author*
" long ſince."

SOLUTION.

There are, certainly, no Appearances in Dreaming more ſurprizing than our ready familiarity with new Objects; and this ſeeming Reminiſcence of paſt Things, which, when awake, we are conſcious we never knew. The former of theſe I have attempted to explain and account for in the Solution of the laſt *Difficulty*. In the Conſideration of theſe, and all other Inſtances of Dreaming, we ſhould firſt obſerve, how the like Thoughts are produced by the Soul, and effect us waking; and then, the Difference between a waking, and a ſleeping State: This will abate much of our Aſtoniſhment. It hath been ſhewn, that the Soul cannot avoid believing that every Object its Imagination exhibits in Sleep, is really brought in by

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the Senſes: This, together with what was ſaid to the laſt *Difficulty*, will explain thoſe Things, in the Dreams here inſtanced, which relate to preſent Time; *v. g.* The *dead Woman living, and in a State of Marriage*, and the *Situation of preſent Circumſtances*; as alſo, *the Reader*, tho' not the Sentences read. [How the Soul ſhould want a Conſciouſneſs of raiſing theſe imaginary Scenes, and that it ſhould be conſcious of performing its own Parts in them, and conſcious that other Actors perform theirs, will be, anon, ſpoke to.] Theſe Particulars, then, being laid aſide, let us proceed to conſider the other Parts of theſe Dreams, *viz. The Circumſtances of the paſt Life* of the married Couple; and *the previous Acquaintance with the viſionary Author's Subject, and the Remarks ready to be offered thereon.* I may venture to ſuppoſe, that theſe, *ſome Circumſtances* remembered, were not many, tho' this Gentleman concludes the Sentence thus, " as if " he had been led into it *from the Expe-* " *rience of ſome Years*;" for I underſtand him to intend no more, than that the Soul acquieſces in the Certainty of the paſt and preſent Circumſtances, as it would do if the

the Dream had been a Reality. I conceive too, that the *certain Sentences* read were few. Nor can I doubt, but that both *Circumſtances* and *Sentences*, will be admitted within the Power of the Dreamer's Imagination to form, when waking. But the yet remaining Myſtery is, how thoſe Things ſhould ſeem to the Soul as Remembered, which it never knew before; or, in other words, how it can regard its preſent, as paſt Knowledge. Let us examine this Matter by our waking Thoughts: He who imagines, when awake, that he ſees an unknown Perſon reading, can, by the ſame Faculty, add to that Image, a Subject which he may conceit him reading, and a manner of treating that Subject, and then form Objections to the Arguments of his own framing. Tho' all the Parts of this Scene are new, yet, as to the Order of their Creation by the Fancy, they muſt precede one another in point of Time. The Objections raiſed againſt the Arguments, preſuppoſe an intimate Acquaintance with them, which we may call an old one if we pleaſe. If we turn this Scene into a Dream, wherein 'tis impoſſible, as hath been obſerved, to diſtinguiſh ſuch Imaginations from

from Realities, it ſhews, if I miſtake not greatly, the manner in which the preſent Acquaintance with the *viſionary Author* is miſtaken for a paſt Acquaintance: For I do not know from Experience, that in a Dream of this ſort, we ever ſeem to remember as at any certain paſt Period of Time, *v. g.* a Month, a Year, or ſeven Years ago. We come next to the *paſt Circumſtances* remembered in the Dream of Wedlock. Theſe, if thought on when awake, would ſeem as formerly paſſed through, tho' they had never been thought on before the Marriage had its riſe in the Imagination. How then can this be properly called a reſtoring of paſt Knowledge? The Soul, with regard to theſe *Circumſtances*, has a retroſpect to paſt Time, and transfers the *Thought* thither, tho' it never exiſted till the preſent Inſtant, and its *Subject* never had a Being. This is all that is done in Sleep, only with this Difference, that the Idea is then regarded as a Reality. The other Caſes ſtated in this *Difficulty*, may, from what hath been here ſaid, receive their Solution, without our being reduced to the Neceſſity of ſuppoſing the Soul prompted by Spirits

with

with *inſtantaneous Knowledge of what never had been.*

DIFFICULTY IX.

We ſometimes Dream of Courts, Senates, Battles, publick Diverſions; think we make and hear Harangues; and tranſact Matters with various Perſons; and all this ſeems repreſented to the Soul without its contributing in the leaſt thereto, by ſetting the Imagination at Work: Whereas it would be a very laborious Task to us, awake, to form ſuch extenſive and crouded Scenes; *Invention* being a Work of great Difficulty.

SOLUTION.

The imaginative Faculty is vaſtly different in Men; in ſome, it is almoſt inſtantaneous and boundleſs in its Productions; it is *fiery* and *forgetive*, as *Shakeſpear*, well expreſſes, and happily experienced it. In others, it creates ſlowly, and its Proſpects are but narrow. I believe it will appear, upon Examination, that the Dreams of both ſorts of Men are proportionate

tionate to this Faculty, and the extent of their Knowledge when awake. Perhaps the Fancy takes larger flights in Sleep, as not being then check'd by other Buſineſs, nor by the Senſes. However, when any Dream ſhall be produced, which ſhall be apparently beyond the ſtretch of the Imagination and Knowledge of the Man when awake, I ſhall not quarrel at its being aſcribed to a ſupernatural Cauſe. But this is very remote from the Caſe of ordinary Dreams, whoſe Scenes are chiefly laid in well-known Places, and the Actors and Subjects ſuch as we are acquainted with waking, by Converſe, Hiſtory, or otherwiſe; or at moſt, but a Compoſition of theſe modelled by Fancy, the particulars whereof can be traced out, and the whole reduced to its firſt Principles. Let it be remarked too, that Dreams of this complicated Nature, which have a Connection and Continuance of any length, are very rare, unleſs where they take riſe apparently from the Employment of the Day.

That the Soul is not conſcious of ſetting the Imagination to work, during Sleep, is very true; and this I take to be a principal

Reaſon

reaſon why its Acts are performed without any trouble to the Soul; and this too contributes greatly toward preventing the Soul from detecting the Impoſitions (if we muſt call them ſo) of the Fancy. I may appeal to every ones Experience, if he will obſerve it, whether frequently in each Day he has not Imaginary Forms brought before him, which he knows not of going in ſearch after, and even wonders how they were introduced; tho', upon an accurate Examination, he may ſometimes trace out what gave riſe to them. We very often find ourſelves, whilſt Awake, and in an indolent and muſing condition, in new and very buſy Scenes; and are no more conſcious of the Deſign of the Soul to form them, either by an inſtantaneous Act, or a continued Series of Production, than we are during Sleep. This is a very different affair from that of INVENTION, properly ſo called; tho' the Imagination performs both. When the Imagination is exerciſed for any particular purpoſe, the Soul confines it, and rectifies, or ſelects the Forms it brings before it, by the *Judgment*; thoſe which are approved, are laid by to be preſerved in the *Memory*, or elſe

are committed to writing; the others are rejected and diſcarded as much as may be; and then the Imagination is ſent in ſearch of more; and ſo on. This is certainly a work of Fatigue; perhaps Materials come in ſlowly, and the Judgment deliberates long about their Propriety. But, on the contrary, when we controul not the Imagination, but let it fly at all, and purſue its own Game, this coſts us no Pains; many Perſons find much more in pinnioning it. We do not allow ourſelves time to attend its idle Flights when awake; (I ſhould rather ſay Reflect on, for Attention in a proper Senſe, would prevent them) but in Sleep, we can do nothing elſe in the mean time. I look on Sleep as the Province of Imagination; here it reigns. Corporeal Objects are ſhut out and cannot approach the Soul in this State, but myriads of incorporeal Ideas, preſented by the Memory and Imagination, and principally the latter, afford it Exerciſe and Entertainment. It has a World of its own Creation and peopling to range in, and converſe with, tho' then impriſoned in a ſleeping Body. I do not apprehend it poſſible to demonſtrate ſo ſatisfactorily to

all

all Underſtandings, from the Nature of the Soul, that it may ſeperately Exiſt and Think, as we may from this miraculous Faculty of Imagination, which accompanies us in Sleep: And I ſhall be ſorry that ſo clear and convincing a Proof, which is in every one's Power who Dreams, ſhould be argued away, unleſs a better can be ſubſtituted in its room.

DIFFICULTY X.

We are conſcious that we perform our own Parts in Dreams, but have not the leaſt perception that we act the others; nay, we are conſcious that they are performed by other Actors: And to ſuppoſe that we ſhould make Speeches or Anſwers for other imaginary Perſons, and put Doubts in their mouths which we find ourſelves unable to ſolve, and are aſhamed of our Ignorance; or receive Information from others when we heſitate ourſelves; and ſtill want Conſciouſneſs that this is all our own doing; is to admit that we may Think, and at the ſame time have no Conſciouſneſs of it, but even believe our own Thoughts, to be thoſe of another

Perſon; which is a manifeſt abſurdity, and impoſſible; and would, in its Conſequences, carry us into univerſal Scepticiſm: For if we cannot be ſure of our own Thoughts, we ſhall eaſily be inclined to diſtruſt the certainty of every thing elſe. There is a vaſt difference between Thinking of ſuch Circumſtances as theſe waking, and Dreaming them; in the one caſe we are ſatisfied it is all the Work of our own Minds, but in the other, part of it plainly appears foreign to us, as much as any thing in nature can do ſo; and it is therefore highly reaſonable to ſuppoſe it the Work of Spirits.

SOLUTION.

This ſeems the greateſt Myſtery in Dreaming; but a Reflection on what hath been ſaid, will go far towards bringing it within our Comprehenſion; and perhaps anon we ſhall be able to think of it without ſurprize. We have no poſſible way, or at leaſt no known one, whereby to diſtinguiſh between what we imagine to See, Hear, *&c.* and a real Appearance. The Soul cannot contradict the Perceptions it is

conſcious

conſcious of. I do not find any much greater Cauſe of wonder at the Imagination's putting a Fallacy on us with regard to the Actions of other Perſons, than that it ſhould make us believe ſo very erroneouſly concerning ourſelves. We are perſuaded by it, that we Speak, Read, Write, Sail, nay Fly; and all the while, we are Aſleep. We are not conſcious that we Think of theſe Actions, but that we really perform them. This miſtake is occaſioned by the ſuppoſed Uſe of the Senſes in Sleep. Indeed the Identity remains with us in theſe Caſes; we are conſcious of being the Performers. Let us then ſee how far our waking Thoughts can transfer (if I may ſo expreſs it) this Identity, to imaginary Perſons. Suppoſe then, that a *Conference* be imagined, Waking; whenever any diſcovery is made by the Soul in theſe mental and ſilent Arguings, if it ſeems to come from one of the Imaginary Perſons, as very frequently it does, the Soul, in the Act of Imagining, does not detect that this Diſcovery was made by itſelf; it is true, when the Conference ceaſes, or whilſt it is carrying on, the Soul can, by another and very different Act, reflect thereon, and obtain

a Con-

a Conſciouſneſs that it owed this Diſcovery to no foreign Aſſiſtance; but this muſt be aſcertained by conſulting the Senſes, and a want of Conſciouſneſs that it was communicated by them. I did not Hear any Perſon tell me this, I neither Saw or Read it; therefore it was my own Suggeſtion; my Imagination has been at Work. But the State of Sleep forbids this kind of Reaſoning: Nor can we, whilſt awake, Imagine and Reflect at the ſame Inſtant. When we retain a Conſciouſneſs of what we ourſelves did or ſaid in Sleep, and have likewiſe a Conſciouſneſs that the reſt was performed by others; what is this more than we do with regard to the above ſuppoſed Conference when Awake, upon Reflection? We have every jot as diſtinct a Conſciouſneſs of our own Parts, and thoſe of others, as a Dream can afford us. Here we ſay, without the leaſt Heſitation, it was all the Work of our Imagination. If a Perſon is asked, how he knows that? the Anſwer is very ready and very true, "I was awake, and had my Senſes about me." And really no ſtronger Proof can be given, or required. May not a Man then as reaſonably ſay, "I dreamt that I did,

"and

" and ſaid, ſuch a Thing, and another " Perſon a different Thing; and tho' I " can clearly diſtinguiſh him, and what " relates to him, from myſelf, and my " own Words and Actions; I am certain, " that I Thought the whole, tho' I was not " conſcious thereof during Sleep, becauſe " I had not then my Senſes to diſcover to " me that I only Thought." I hope there is no Danger of being led to any pernicious Scepticiſm, by not knowing at a particular Time, that we then only Think when we ſeem to Act; or at another Time, that we ourſelves Think, what we ſuppoſe others to Say or Do: Since both theſe harmleſs Miſtakes, which make no inconſiderable part of our Happineſs in this Life, are ſoon rectified when we are Awake and in our right Mind. The Facts ſeem to be thus, and we need not fear to follow where-ever Truth conducts us. The Confuſion ſuppoſed in this *Difficulty*, is a neceſſary Conſequence of our Pride, or Modeſty, and the imagined reality of the Perſons we diſpute with. The Soul, during Sleep, when it wants the Senſes, but takes it for granted that it has them, is much alike in its working with that of a Perſon

whoſe

whoſe Imagination is too powerful to be interrupted by his Senſes; ſuch a one Talks to himſelf, Contradicts himſelf, and Quarrels with himſelf under the Appearance of a Fancy-created Opponent: Had this Man ability to conſult his Senſes, the Cheat were over; but in both Caſes the Soul is too buſily engaged about its Objects, and too well ſatisfied of their Reality to diſtruſt them.

Objection.

Here it will be ſaid, that what I aſcribe to the Power and Prevalency of the Imagination, is better accounted for by ſuppoſing, either that the Senſory is diſordered, as in the Caſes of Frenzy, Drunkenneſs, a Wound in the Brain, *&c.* ſo that the Traces in it are thereby obſcured, defaced, or miſrepreſented to the Soul; or elſe that Spirits, during the Diſorder of that Organ, take their opportunity of intruding Illuſions; and that in Sleep, when this Organ cannot be uſed by the Soul, they employ it for their purpoſes. That to attribute the Diſorders affecting the Soul by means of the Senſory, to a defect in ſome

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of the Soul's Faculties, or an undue Superiority of its Imagination over the reſt, will be to make the Soul diſordered in itſelf, which its ſimple Nature will not permit us to ſuppoſe. When Men are Mad, Drunk, and Sleeping, the Soul continues to exerciſe its Faculties as rationally from what the Senſory affords it, and it is percipient of, as when they are Awake, Sober, and in their Senſes.

ANSWER.

My Subject does not call upon me to account for the Manner how the Soul is affected by ſuch violent Bodily Diſorders, as I may be allowed to call unnatural ones; and ſuch whereby the Senſory and the whole Brain undoubtedly ſuffer much. Sleep, *Nature's ſoft Nurſe*, gently lays the Senſes to reſt, without varying our Organization. I cannot regard Sleep as a Diſorder. Whatever odd and fallacious Forms, a Senſory diſcompoſed or ſhattered by Intemperance, or otherwiſe, may put together to miſguide the Judgment when we are Awake, they cannot either by this Author's Hypotheſis, or mine,

take place during Sleep; he denying that the Soul can then view them in the Senſory; and I conjecturing that it has no Occaſion for a ſight of them. But thus much I muſt obſerve, that it is utterly inconceivable by me, that a Mad-Man, who takes himſelf for what he is not, ſuppoſe, a King (and ſome have much odder Thoughts of themſelves) ſhould ſee himſelf ſo pourtrayed in his Senſory; and that a caſual jumbling together of other Traces ſhould produce this. Matter and Motion may effect Wonders at this rate! But admitting that he there ſaw the Repreſentation of a Monarch, with all the Pageantry neceſſary to accompany ſuch a State; and that this were delineated by natural Cauſes, or by Spirits; this Picture might be look'd at by the Mind's Eye, but its being regarded as the Man's own Caſe, and that he ſhould *miſtake it, for himſelf*, muſt certainly have another Cauſe, which I ſhall not here examine into. I ſhall only add, that the reinſtating the loſt and diſperſed Traces in the Senſory ſeems a Work almoſt as curious and wonderful as the Reſurrection of the Body, and demands Omnipotence to perform it;

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and yet we ſee Sleep and Medicine reſtore the Mad and Drunk to their Memory: I am therefore, as well as for other Reaſons, inclined to ſuppoſe that it cannot depend on Traces in the Senſory. Methinks, if we may, to help out our defective Philoſophy, aſſign an Agency of Spirits to occaſion an Impoſition on the Judgment, the Seaſons of Madneſs and Drunkenneſs are abundantly properer than this of Sleep. The Faculty of Imagination will certainly afford what we find produced in ordinary Dreams; and why we are to ſuppoſe the Soul deprived of this Power at a Time when it ſeems principally to exert it, I do not yet ſee. We are not to transfer what may be effected in a natural Way to a ſupernatural Cauſe, by making foreign Agents neceſſary to aſſiſt the Soul in producing a Phœnomenon its own Faculties can bring about. Let it be firſt demonſtrated that the Senſory is neceſſary for Memory; and then, that the Soul cannot view it during Sleep. I have ſeveral Times obſerved, that we have Memory in Sleep: and endeavoured to ſhew, that tho' Spirits ſhould preſent Objects to us, it is improbable that they could make

us Remember to have ſeen them before; but that the Power of Recognition muſt be in the Soul, as retaining its former Idea, with which it compares the preſent Object.

This Author would have the *letting looſe the Imagination upon us*, to be conſider'd as the ſame Thing with *letting in the Agency of Spirits:* But I muſt take the liberty of diſſenting from him. To ſuppoſe that a Faculty of the Soul may, without the Interpoſition of a ſupernatural Cauſe, be reſtrain'd, and enlarg'd, at different Times, with regard to its Power over the Materials of our Knowledge, ſeems not to carry the leaſt Abſurdity in it. We experience the Soul to exert its Faculties in a very different Degree, at different Times; and ſometimes one Faculty in preference to another, when the Body affords no diſcernable Help or Impediment. The *Paſſions* are ſometimes *let looſe* upon Men, in the ſame Senſe the Imagination is, even when they have an incorporeal Object to work on, v. g. *Fame.* Here the Judgment is reſtrain'd; it cannot determine againſt the Evidence given at its Tribunal, tho' Soul and Body often ſuffer greatly for want of a right

a right Diſcernment of real from imaginary Good. He who believes all Dreams ſupernatural, might, methinks, as eaſily ſuppoſe it practicable for Spirits to apply a Faculty of the Soul, *v. g.* Imagination, to a particular Purpoſe, and for that Time hold back the reſt from obſtructing the Work; as give them, or, which is worſe, the Body, Power to extinguiſh that Faculty; which is certainly done by the Suppoſition that Dreams are not the Work of our own Minds.

I apprehend that we don't ſufficiently diſtinguiſh the Faculty of *Imagination*, from that of *Memory*, unleſs we admit that the Soul can thereby compoſe, and repreſent to itſelf, Objects as received by the Senſes, which were never conveyed to it by them, under that particular Form; and alſo can realize, and make its paſt Ideas appear as preſent: Whereas the Memory always conſiders what is paſt, as paſt. Ideas Remember'd, appear to the Soul under the ſame Form with their Objects brought in by the Senſe; and whenever we review them, we ſhould, if the Senſes forbad it not, regard them as corporeally beheld

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at a paſt Time: Here, therefore, the Imagination has nothing to do. This Faculty is then truly exercis'd, when its own Forms, compounded and made up in ſuch Manner as the Senſes never preſented them, are regarded as brought in by the Senſes: and when paſt Ideas are conſider'd as if they then made their firſt Entrance into the Mind. The Soul, in the Act of Imagining, cannot ſuppoſe the contrary; that muſt be diſcover'd by another Act, *viz.* Reflection on the having uſed, or not uſed, the Senſes, or the Imaginative Power: and this cannot be a doubt during Sleep; wherein the Soul ever ſuppoſes it actually uſes the Senſes, nor knows that it then uſes the Imagination. How very dreadfully is the Imagination of timorous Perſons Waking, let looſe upon them in Church-yards, haunted Apartments, and other Places of which they have form'd frightful Ideas; only becauſe they want the bodily Uſe of one Senſe! Theſe unhappy Perſons have no more Power to reſtrain the Imagination, and turn it to other Objects, than a Sleeping Perſon has: and ſome of them can hardly, perhaps not at all, be brought to diſtruſt the Imagination upon

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the credit of the Senſes, in conjunction with Reaſon itſelf. Muſt we call this *Poſſeſſion*, and the Work of *Supernatural Agents?* Memory alone could not produce the horrid apprehenſions Men are oppreſs'd with in ſuch caſes; the Ideas preſented by that faculty, would be regarded as former perceptions of the Soul; but 'tis the Imagination which realizes, and makes them appear as preſent. I think we may almoſt as well roundly deny ſuch a Faculty to the Soul, as admit it to perform nothing; or ſo much leſs than it does.

DIFFICULTY XI.

Were Dreams no more than Thoughts during Sleep, it is not likely that the Soul would ſo terrify itſelf as frequently it does; ſome perſons ſeldom paſs a night without very troubleſome Dreams. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe the Soul ſhould lay a Plot to frighten itſelf, without knowing that it did ſo; and were it conſcious of ſuch contrivance, it could not be affrighted at what appears to it. This therefore muſt be the work of Spirits.

SOLUTION.

There are many ways to account for frightful Dreams; as from Bodily Diſorders, Grief, Apprehenſion of approaching Danger, and indeed every other internal cauſe of the Soul's perturbation when Awake. As to the manner how Dreams of a particular complexion reſult from particular Senſations, we muſt remain a little in the dark: but in regard theſe appearances are, I think, pretty uniform; as, he who ſleeps with his Head in a ſliding poſition, commonly dreams of falling down; he who lies cold, ſeldom has very ſanguine dreams, and the like; we have little occaſion for aſcribing them to Spirits. How much ſoever we are terrified in Dreams, there is certainly no Plot in the caſe; and that is the very reaſon we are ſo terrified. Who will ſay that he hath not frequently in every day, or it may be hour, whilſt awake, many Thoughts which he is not conſcious of bringing before his Mind; but they ſeem to have preſented themſelves ſpontaneouſly? Nothing which the Soul Imagines in Sleep, ariſes from premeditation;

tion; and every thing muſt appear Real; for the Reaſons before given: Were this the Caſe Waking (as it is ſometimes) and ſenſible Objects did not aſſiſt in calling us off from one Train of Ideas to another; the Soul would ſuffer as much Pain from oppreſſing Thoughts, which it did not hunt after, and yet were brought before it in a Way not Supernatural, as it does in Dreams. Let it be obſerved too, that our Diſpoſitions accompany us very cloſely in Dreams; and, in all probability, influence the Imagination in its Productions. The *Hero*, *Philoſopher*, *Lover*, and *Debauchee*, have, as it were, their proper Dreams: And I doubt not that *Don Quixote* was Victorious, and *Sancho* drub'd, in moſt encounters they reſpectively dreamt of.

DIFFICULTY XII.

We ſometimes Dream moſt inconſiſtent Things, and look on them as Real, which would appear contradictory to Nature and Reaſon, were we awake. Beaſts ſpeak; one Appearance is converted into another, we Fly, &c. The Soul could not impoſe any thing as real on itſelf in

Sleep, which it muſt believe an impoſſibility, waking; or at leaſt not poſſible to any thing but ſupernatural Power.

SOLUTION.

It is certain the Imagination performs Wonders in Sleep; tho' thoſe of this kind are not very frequent. But till we rival *Ovid* and *Æſop*, it muſt be admitted within the Power of the Imagination to produce ſuch Ideas. As to their ſuppoſed Reality; and our want of Conſciouſneſs of producing them, by any deſigned *Invention*, I preſume enough has been ſaid; I will only add, that he whoſe Imagination exhibits ſuch abſurd Appearances in Sleep, has (tho' it ſeems a Paradox) more inducement, I had almoſt ſaid Reaſon, to rely on them as Realities, than a waking Perſon. Whoever Sees or Imagines ſuch Things, whilſt awake, has his Reaſon to correct his Senſes, and his Senſes as a Check on his Imagination; whereas a ſleeping Perſon can have no Objection made by his Senſes to any thing he Imagines.

DIFFICULTY XIII.

If Dreams are only Thoughts during Sleep; and the Soul then believes that it uſes the Senſes; and this miſtake, and not the real View of Objects preſented by Spirits, is the Reaſon of our not knowing that we are then only Thinking, when we ſuppoſe ourſelves to See, Hear, &c. It will be ſcarce poſſible to prove that we are at any time Awake; ſince, according to this Suppoſition, we are as well ſatisfied of our having the Uſe of the Senſes in one State, as the other.

SOLUTION.

On having recourſe to the Senſes, we can, whilſt awake, aſſure ourſelves by Experiment, of the difference between Thinking or Imagining, and Seeing, Hearing, &c. I do not know a better Way of proving myſelf Awake, than by making a Queſtion of it. This doubt does not occur in Sleep, becauſe the imaginary Uſe of the Senſes prevents it. I have before taken Notice, that ſometimes we think we

are Dreaming; but this I conjectured muſt be in an Interval of Dreaming. It is very poſſible for a Perſon to Dream of *going to bed*; but I believe few Dream of their *Dreaming whilſt there*. If we admit that Phantaſms are preſented to the Soul in Sleep, it is not leſs wonderful that we ſhould apprehend them to have been brought in by the Senſes, which we certainly do in ordinary Dreams; than that our Thoughts during Sleep ſhould paſs for real Appearances: And we ſhould on that Suppoſition be as much at a loſs in proving ourſelves Awake.

DIFFICULTY XIV.

If ordinary Dreams are to be attributed to natural Cauſes; and we are to ſuppoſe, that becauſe the Soul conſtantly looks on the Objects as preſented by the Senſes, therefore it is not conſcious that it barely Thinks; what Diſtinction can it poſſibly make between ſuch Dreams as owe their Origin to natural and to ſupernatural Cauſes? If ſupernatural Dreams are admitted, it is highly reaſonable to expect a certainty in this behalf.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

This Criterion would be much better given by one who has been honoured with ſupernatural Dreams. That ſuch are very diſtinguiſhable from common ones I make no doubt: And tho' it ſhould be impracticable for the Soul during Sleep to obſerve any difference in the manner of their Communication; this would not diſprove the poſſibility of its Conviction, when we are Awake, that they were ſupernatural; as from the uncommon force with which they affected the Soul; their foretelling future Events; diſcovery of paſt Actions, &c. Some of the Dreams mentioned in *Scripture* as ſupernatural, ſeem principally denoted ſuch by their Accompliſhment, and, perhaps, were not before regarded by the Dreamers themſelves in that Light; as being very much within the Limits of their imaginative Power. But tho' I conjecture the Soul conſtantly to apprehend its uſing the Senſes in Sleep, and that therefore its Thoughts appear as real as a Phantaſm would; I deſire to be underſtood with this Reſtriction, that God undoubtedly can

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ſuſpend this Apprehenſion, and by ſhewing us that we are Sleeping, imprint ſuch legible Marks on his Orders given, and Promiſes and Revelations made during Sleep, that the Soul cannot miſtake them for its own Thoughts. The ſuppoſition that all Dreams are ſupernatural, leaves us much more in the dark as to the Credit we ought to give the Spirits who entertain us; than the Opinion that their Repreſentations when we are favoured with them, are manifeſtly diſcernable, either during Sleep, or at leaſt when we wake, from our ſleeping Thoughts.

DIFFICULTY XV.

It is thought that Dreams muſt proceed from Spirits, in regard, that if the Senſory were not ſhut during Sleep, but the Soul, by means of the Animal Spirits, or otherwiſe, could perpetually uſe it, the Body could not Sleep; becauſe the Soul from its active Nature would be inceſſantly working on this Organ, wherein the Materials of its Knowledge are contained; and, undoubtedly, this Part of the Body requires Reſt.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

If the Senſory be not neceſſary for Memory, which I have endeavoured to ſhew, this *Difficulty* is of eaſy Diſpatch: For we might as reaſonably Object the cloſing of the Eye in Sleep; and thence infer that as the Soul is precipent of Objects in that State, the Senſe of Seeing muſt have been communicated to it by Spirits; becauſe, if the Soul perpetually uſed the Eye for Seeing, that Organ would want its neceſſary Reſt. If the Senſory be neceſſary for Memory, how do we Remember in Sleep, when it is cloſed from the View of the Soul? If we can Remember in one Inſtance, without its Aid, I think we may in all. I have made it appear very improbable, that Spirits by any Repreſentation of Objects for the firſt Time, ſhould give us Memory. It ſeems exceedingly ſtrange, that were the Senſory ſo neceſſary a part to the Soul as it is ſuppoſed, it ſhould continue out of its power in Sleep, ſince we experience it ſometimes to uſe other Parts of the Body which can do it no Service; we ſpeak, riſe, walk, *&c.*

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in Sleep; and this without waking ourſelves. With regard to the Neceſſity of Reſt for the Senſory, and the Suppoſition that the Soul's uſing it muſt keep the Body waking. I do not apprehend that the Soul's uſing it could more, nor indeed ſo much, affect it as Spirits: For theſe are ſuppoſed to make new Traces in it, whereas the Soul would only review thoſe already there. The Opinion that Dreams are the Work of the Soul, independent of the Senſory, leaves that Organ quite at Reſt, together with the Senſes.

DIFFICULTY XVI.

If Dreams proceed from natural Cauſes, and we can Imagine in Sleep, unaſſiſted by the Senſory; it may be reaſonably ſuppoſed that we always Dream; and if ſo, it is much to be wondered at, that ſome Perſons, who have otherwiſe very ſtrong and retentive Memories, Remember ſo few of their Dreams. But if Dreams are Repreſentations made by Spirits, this Wonder ceaſes; becauſe we may probably Conjecture that in thoſe Intervals, wherein Memory will not aſſure us that we

we dreamt, the Spirits did not practice on us. *N. B.* This *Difficulty* comes not from the learned Author; (who ſuppoſes that the Soul is in its Nature a Subſtance from which Thinking is inſeperable; and that Spirits, during Sleep, ſupply it with Materials; and hath very ingeniouſly obſerved, that tho' we may ſometimes not be *conſcious of having Thought* at a paſt Time, we cannot be *conſcious that we did not then Think*) but it is raiſed by ſuch as are at a loſs to ſatisfy themſelves, from the Operations of the Soul, that it always Thinks in Sleep.

SOLUTION.

It muſt be acknowledged, that if we perpetually Dream, we forget many of our Dreams; and that ſome Perſons paſs whole Nights, without being conſcious, when they awake, that they have dreamt. Mr. *Locke* and others tell us of thoſe who profeſſed themſelves to have paſſed whole Years of Nights thus: The Truth of which it is hard to diſprove; but more difficult to believe. That a waking Perſon ſhould Think, and not know at the Time

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that he does ſo, is certainly impoſſible; but that he may very ſhortly after not be conſcious of the particular Subject which employ'd his Thoughts at a paſt Time, is every Hour's Experience. This will not ſatisfy: If you cannot recount every particular Thought a Day yields, you can diſtinctly remember many. Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes the Caſe of one, who, when you awake him, cannot tell you what he thought on the preceding Minute, nor knows that he was then Thinking. To this it might be anſwered; that the ſudden Tranſition from Sleeping to Waking, may be ſuppoſed to affect us at leaſt as powerfully as a ſurprize does when awake, which frequently leaves us quite at a loſs for what we thought about immediately before it. This will, perhaps, be admitted; but it will be ſaid, that we are ſure we then Thought, tho' the Subject has eſcaped us; whereas in the other Caſe we are not certain, nor have the leaſt Remembrance, even of that. I Anſwer. When any waking Thoughts are forgot, by ſurprize, or otherwiſe, I do not apprehend that the Soul can aſſure itſelf of having Thought at the Time which the loſt Thoughts took

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up, but from the Report of the Senſes, that we were then awake; from whence the Soul draws this Concluſion, *I Thought*. This Proof the State of Sleep cannot afford; and, therefore, if the Objects of our Dreams are loſt, it is not to be expected that the Soul ſhould retain Conſciouſneſs of having Thought at all. But it is urged, that even when we awake of ourſelves, and at the uſual Time, not a ſingle Thought, but a whole Night's Buſineſs is forgot; which ſo exceedingly differs from our Caſe waking, that we muſt go ſtill farther to make it appear probable that we have Thought. Let us then conſider, how our Thoughts affect us, when awake, with regard to Time. When there is a quick Succeſſion of various Thoughts, we ſuppoſe ourſelves to have paſt thro' a conſiderable Portion of Time: As on the contrary, where few differing Thoughts have occupied the Mind, or one alone hath maintained its Station there, we do not perceive how Time runs. Had we no other Meaſure of Time, than the Train of our Ideas, the Accounts kept by one of a lively, and another of a ſlow Imagination, would very widely vary. Sup-

poſe then, that the Mind of him who Remembers little of his Dreams, has been taken up by only a few Thoughts during the whole Night; when he wakes, he will be apt to conclude, that in regard he finds himſeif to have ſlept many Hours, he cannot have dreamt the whole Time: Tho' according to the Computation by Thinking, the ſame quantity of Time muſt have ſlipt by him unobſerved, had he been awake. If it be objected, that ſhould the Mind dwell ſo long as I am willing to ſuppoſe it, on a few Thoughts, it is likely their Impreſſions would be too ſtrong and laſting, to be obliterated and loſt on waking. Let it be conſidered, that a ſingle Thought or Image (I do not mean a train of Thoughts or Reaſoning on one Subject) or ſeveral different Images, may remain a conſiderable Time in the Mind, when in an indolent and inattentive State, without affecting it ſo forcibly, as to be recovered after a Surprize. When we awake, one or more of the Senſes conſtantly ſollicites the regard of the Mind, in a manner which may be deemed Equivalent to a ſudden Avocation from Thinking on a particular Subject when awake; and

and inſtantaneouſly the Buſineſs of the Day ruſhes in, and engroſſes us: Why then ſhould it ſeem ſtrange that many ſleeping Thoughts eſcape the reſearch of the Mind when it would call back its fleeting Dreams? Tho' I am perſuaded that were Perſons to make it their firſt Buſineſs in the Morning, to ſurvey that of the Night, they would ſeldom miſs of enough to ſatisfy them, that they had not been very idle. Thoſe Dreams which we moſt frequently Remember, are on ſuch Subjects as would have commanded much of our Attention, had we been waking: May it not then be rationally conjectured, that thoſe we forget, juſt appeared, and gave place to their Succeſſors, ſo that none of them kept their Station long enough, or affected the Mind ſufficiently to claim a particular regard; and that the Confuſion ariſing from the whole, has (in Conjunction with the other Cauſes abovementioned) left the Mind without Conſciouſneſs of any individual: And if no particular Thought be remembered, it is impoſſible the Soul ſhould be conſcious that it Thought in Sleep. We muſt Reaſon with ſome uncertainty from the *Nature* of

of a Being ſo inſcrutable by us as the Soul is; I think our *Experience of its Effects*, except in Caſes where *Revelation* affords its Light, is the beſt ſource of our Knowledge. That one great End of Sleep, is the Eaſe and Refreſhment of the Body, and Renovation of its Powers, is certain: And whether the Soul, during its Union with ſo unequal a Partner, which but too often we find very troubleſome to it, may not have been ſo conſtituted as to require a Relaxation (I do not ſay Ceſſation) from its Labour, muſt remain a little doubtful, till we are better acquainted with *Immaterial Subſtance*, and the difference between its Powers, whilſt in the Body, and when in a State of ſeparate Exiſtence. That in our preſent State, ſome nightly Remiſſion of the Intenſeneſs of Thinking is neceſſary to refit (if I may ſo call it) the Soul for the Buſineſs and Cares of the Day, is rendered not improbable, if we conſider, that the Minds of thoſe who remember great part of their Dreams, ſeem, when they awake, to be apparently fatigued; whereas thoſe who retain few of their Dreams, find the Soul's Faculties in a much apter Condition for freſh Employment. If it be objected, that this ſuppoſed wearineſs of the Mind is only a bodily Diſorder. I Anſwer; admiting

mitting it to be ſo, it is ſuch a one as muſt be acknowledged owing to the Diſturbance or Interruption of the Body's neceſſary Reſt by the Soul's intenſe Thinking; and this, in its Effects, is reverberated on the Soul in ſuch a manner as to impede the Exerciſe of its Powers. So that whether this Fatigue be attributed to the Soul or Body, it is an Argument for the needfulneſs of a Relaxation of the Soul's Labour whilſt in the Body. For my own Part, I find no ſuch Chaſms in Dreaming as induce me to ſuſpect that the Soul does not perpetually Think; but it is too great a Task for me to convince another that he dreamt a whole Night, if he wants Conſciouſneſs of having dreamt in any part of it.

The foregoing are the moſt conſiderable Appearances in ordinary Dreams, which I at preſent recollect; and, methinks, they may be well accounted for, from the Exerciſe of the Soul's Power over its paſt Ideas, without any new, or foreign ſupply. If Perſons could be brought to believe that Spirits have this nightly concern with them, it might go far toward reforming their daily Practices; but I am apprehenſive that this Way of explaining the Phœnomenon of Dreaming, by ſhuting up the Senſory, makes that Organ ſo neceſſary to

Memory,

Memory, that the Soul, on parting from it, muſt loſe all its paſt Knowledge and Conſciouſneſs, for that muſt, methinks, ſtay or go with the Memory: And unleſs it can be demonſtrated from *Revelation*, or *Reaſon*, that Spirits ſupply the Soul with Materials for Thinking, and give it moreover a ſupernatural Memory; and that they will continue to do ſo hereafter, without the Help of a corporeal Senſory, which, according to this learned Author's Hypotheſis, they now uſe for their Repreſentations; I fear this may lead ſome to conceit, that as two very great Powers of the Soul, *v. g. Memory* and *Imagination*, are ſuppoſed to *ceaſe in Sleep*, in regard they depend on a Bodily Organ; *others may ſtand ſtill on Death*. Whereas, if we can ſhew, which I have attempted in a far too weak and injudicious Manner, that *Sleep wherein the Body gives not the leaſt aſſiſtance to the Soul, by the Senſes, Senſory, or otherwiſe, leaves it in Poſſeſſion of every intellectual Faculty; and that the Soul has, beſides, the imaginary Uſe of the Body*; it is highly probable that a total Separation from the Body will do the ſame; and, if ſo, it is abſolutely certain, that we cannot want full Employment, even from ourſelves, to all Eternity.

F I N I S.

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